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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CRAIG J. REECE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 19600

vs.
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE
OF UTAH, and the UNIVERSITY
OF UTAH,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for restitution and declaratory judgment
that the respondents violated Craigfs rights to procedural due
process with their policies and procedures for increasing rent
at student family housing at the University. Also, the
practices of using rent to finance new construction and capital
improvements on a cash basis violates substantive due process
and equal protection of the laws.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW
Judge Sawaya, of the Third Judicial District Court, denied
and struck the appellantfs motions for partial summary
judgment; and granted motions for summary judgment by each
respondent.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks an order reversing or vacating summary
judgment for each respondent; an order granting each of the
appellant's motions for partial summary judgment; a remand for
trial on the issue of the amount of restitution to be paid to
the appellant; and an order granting costs on appeal. In the
alternative, appellant seeks reversal and remand for a trial on
all issues, and his costs on appeal.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Craig Reece is a student at the University of Utah. He and
his family have resided in the University Village, a part of
Student Family Housing, since August 1, 1980 (R.2).
sets rent at $244.00 per month.

The lease

The lease contains a rent

escalator clause that allows rent to be increased if utility,
operating, or maintenance costs increase (R.273).

The rent has

been summarily increased four times to the present rate of
$302.00 per month (R.8).

Utilities are estimated from a master

meter for the entire Village rather than actual costs from
individual meters on each apartment (R.273, 357)•
The Village was constructed with funds from revenue bonds
sold by the University and the Board of Regents between 1965
and 1979 (R.3).

Other campus enterprises were also constructed

with different bonds of the same series. All of these
facilities comprise the Student Housing Bond System, which is
the Village, Baliff Food Service, dormitories, Medical Plaza

-2-
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housing for medical students, and the University Bookstore
(R.3).

This bond system is financially operated separately

from the rest of the University.
By law, these facilities must collect sufficient revenue so
that the income, together with land grant interest, will pay
the bond debt without supplemental appropriations from the
legislature.

Utah Code Ann. § 53-38-3(7) (1953 as amended).

The policy of the Board of Regents requires the Village to also
be self-supporting as to operating and maintenance costs
(R.279).

The exact definition of this policy was a matter of

dispute in the trial court (R.313-14).
Craig Reece filed suit seeking declaratory relief and a
refund of rent because the policies, practices, and procedures
of the respondents in increasing and spending rent are
unconstitutional.

He also challenged the construction of a

second maintenance building--the Village already has one--with
surplus rent (R.5).

The other issues raised in the complaint

are supplementary and will not be expressly addressed on appeal.
Craig moved for partial summary judgment on the legality of
the maintenance building (R.25).

The respondents did not

answer the motion and failed to appear at the hearing.

The

^Counsel for respondents had unsuccessfully attempted to
reschedule the hearing, as explained in the affidavits (R.105,
100, 103). In retaliation for Craigfs appearance at the
hearing, they fabricated a story that Craig had lied to the
judge (R.96) and filed a motion to have him held in contempt
(R.95). They do not know what was said because they were not
present. The motion for contempt was withdrawn without
argument at the August 8, 1983, hearing.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trial court granted the motion (R.94), but did not sign an
order to that effect (R.lll).

The motion for partial summary

judgment was rescheduled by the respondents for August 8, 1983,
nearly two months after the motion was filed (R.286, 294).
On July 20, 1983, the Board of Regents filed a motion to
dismiss (R.112), and the University filed a motion for summary
judgment (R.114) on July 21. On August 2, Craig filed requests
for admissions and requests for the production of documents
from each respondent (R.297-307).

He also filed an affidavit

and motion for continuance pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f).
(R.308, 316, 318).
After oral argument on the motions, the judge mailed a
minute entry granting both of the respondents1 motions and
denying Craig's motion for partial summary judgment.

(R.329).

However, no judgment was entered because the respondents did
not prepare one as required by Rule 2.9(a) of the Rules of
Practice in the District and Circuit Courts of the State of
Utah.

Forty-five days after the requests for admission were

filed, Craig filed a motion for partial summary judgment on all
issues except the amount of restitution, a motion to compel the
production of documents, additional affidavits, and the
admissions of the respondents (R.334-61). At the hearing on
this motion, the court refused to hear any argument
(R.387-88).

Judgment was finally entered on October 7, 1983

(R.368).

-4-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MATTERS IN THE REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS ARE
DEEMED ADMITTED FOR FAILURE TO RESPOND.
The disposition of the unanswered requests for admission is
important to the factual base of the issues on appeal.

The

matters in a request for admission are "admitted unless, within
30 days after service of the request, or within such shorter or
longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the
request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a written answer or objection. . . . "
P. 36(a).

Utah R. Civ.
2
The court did not extend the time for answering,

nor did the respondents file an answer or objection for the
sixty-two days between the filing of the requests and the
hearing on the second motion for partial summary judgment.
The respondents must either treat the facts in the requests
as immaterial, in which case they may not complain about their
admissions, or they must concede that it was error to grant
summary judgment while the requests were unanswered.

Any doubt

about the existence of a material issue of fact must be
resolved in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment.

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah

1982).
Requests for admission may be filed at any time, even after

^The respondents orally requested an extension of time at the
August 8 hearing, but the request was denied by the judge.
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the hearing on a motion for summary judgment.

Pittsburg Hotels

Assfn v. Urban Redev. Auth., 29 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
The time to answer the admissions is not suspended by the
pendency of a motion for summary judgment.
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).

Schmitt v.

The issue here is whether

a minute entry granting summary judgment terminates discovery
when no judgment is entered.
A minute entry is not a judgment and does not terminate the
proceedings in the trial court. Wilson v. Manning, 645 P.2d
655 (Utah 1982).

It is merely a memorandum from which the

judgment is to be entered; it does not preclude further
proceedings.

Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah

414, 135 P.2d 919 (1943); Yusky v. Chief Consol. Mining Co., 65
Utah 269, 236 P. 452 (1925); Robison v. Fillmore Commercial 8e
Sav. Bank, 61 Utah 398, 213 P. 790 (1923).
Rule 2.9(a) of the R. Prac. Dist. & Cir. Courts recognizes
the interlocutory nature of minute rulings. The prevailing
3
party has a maximum of fifteen days to prepare a judgment.
Compliance with Rule 2.9 is a prerequisite to the entry of a
final judgment.

Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980).

Any prejudice to the respondents is due to their
inexcusable neglect.

If the respondents did not want the

matters admitted, they should have objected to the requests or
moved to set the admissions aside under Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b).
The entry of judgment also would have prevented the admissions,

3Rules 2.9(a) and (b) are quoted in full at app. A-3.
-6-
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but counsel for respondents made an error of law in thinking he
il! I d riot neeiJ a judgment (R .362)

The respondents s imp 1 v fal led

to make any effort to exclude or prevent the admissions, even
after they knew of Craig's reliant- m
summar y j udgoienI: ,shoi lid not I: e

-he admissions*

'

Since

^.r ^rv requests

are unanswered, the respondents should nor uz-jiit
of law compounded by the! r inexcusaoie neglect.

from a" error
achmitt v .

B i l l i n g s , - >• i .2d at 5] 9
.•

•

/••

.

.

:

;

". P O I N T

ii r

;

.;

••

.. •

THE BOARD OF REGENTS DID NOT AND COULD NOT
DELEGATE THE DUTY TO SET RENT.
A•

The Board of Regents did not delegate the power to set rent

to the Universitv.

The sole basis of the Board's motion in

dismiss was that the pnwei
the University.

l.o tix rent lud been delegated to

Whatever authority the University once had to

set rent was taken away and ^iven to the Board of Regents by
the legislature.
amended),'

Utah Lode Ann, >i 53-48-lb

(1953 as

Only the Board nay act "on behalf of11 the

University cu "equip, furnish, maintain, And operate such
projects and buildings.

hoi (.lie use and availability ot the

foregoing, the board may impose and collect rents, fees, and
charges from students

""

Section Si-?^ -1 (--0 ,

See a I so ,

k "ji'3-38-3 {7 ) (f'lie board l -IM^ I IX rent to pledge to the b o n d ) . .'
The events litigated in this suit show the wi^ioni of the
statutorv svstem of checks and ha l a m p s ,

^Quoted in full at app. A - 2 .
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In accordance with these directives, the Board used to set
rent.

This longstanding practice was changed when the Board

"delegated11 these duties to the University in May, 1980
(R.278).

The source for this belief is the following excerpt

from the minutes:
President Gardner [of the University of Utah]
suggested that Board policy be modified to
require Board review and approval of housing and
food charges only in the event that student
housing is not self-supporting from user
charges. Regent Newey offered a motion to
request the Commissioner to draft an amendment to
the Board's auxiliary policy to incorporate
President Gardner's recommendation. He
emphasized that those institutions that are using
other options as provided in the housing addendum
adopted by the Board today should continue to
submit their proposed housing and food charges to
the Board to be subject to its approval. Regent
Brockbank seconded and the motion was unanimously
adopted.
(R.279).

The only directive here is for the Commissioner to

draft the proposed rule. The board did not produce the
requested final draft of the proposed rule (R.304).
The Institutional Council has only those powers over Board
responsibilities that are 'Specifically authorized and
delegated to the council by the board of regents. . . . "
Code Ann. § 53-48-19(2).

Utah

To delegate is to appoint and direct

someone to act as the agent of the delegator.

The Board simply

decided to withhold approval, it did not direct or empower the
institutional council to do anything.
A delegation of authority is the making of a "rule" because
it is a "statement of general applicability . . . that
implements . . . the law or prescribes the policy of the agency

-8-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the administration of its functions. . . •"
§ 63-46-3(4) (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann.

To make such a rule, the Board

must post a public notice for five days prior to the meeting,
§ 63-46-12(2).

This notice must include a statement of the

terms or substance of the proposed rule and the reasons for its
adoption, § 63-46-5(1) (a) (1953 & Supp. 1983).

Then,

interested persons must be permitted to offer comments on the
proposed rule, § 63-46-12(1).

The board refused to produce the

minutes and agendas that would establish noncompliance with
these requirements (R.305).
To assert that the board intended the minutes and
resolution to be a final rulemaking is to impute an intent to
evade the clear notice and comment requirements of the law.
rule is void if inadequate public notice is given.

A

D.C.

Transit System, Inc. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1438 (D.C. Cir.
1983) . Rules are also void if not written and promulgated
according to statute.

Patterson v. Alpine City, 663 P.2d 95

(Utah 1983).
An agency action is also void if there is no justification
for it in the administrative record.

The court will not supply

a reasoned basis for the action that the agency has not given.
Mountain States Legal Found, v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 636
P.2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981).

This is especially important

where, as here, the agency reverses its prior position.
A "settled course of behavior embodies the
agency's informed judgment that, by pursuing that
course, it will carry out the policies committed
to it by [the legislature]. There is, then, at

-9-
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least a presumption that those policies will be
carried out best if the settled rule is adhered
to.n Atchison, T & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of
Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1373). Accordingly,
an agency changing its course by rescinding a
rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis
for the change beyond that which may be required
when an agency does not act in the first instance.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866 (1983).

Post-hoc rationalizations by

appellate counsel are unacceptable.

Id. at 2870.

The intended

delegation never occurred because no such rule was properly
promulgated.
B.

The Board cannot delegate the power to set rent. Counsel

for the Board suggested that the power to set rent is optional
because § 53-38-1(4) says the board "may11 set rent (R.280).
The Board's longstanding practice of actually setting rent
belies this interpretation.

There is no statute saying the

University may set rent. The University has only those powers
expressly granted by the legislature. First Equity Corp. v.
Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975).

The power to

charge fees must be given in "clear, express, and unmistakable
terms.11

Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Comm'n, 657

P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1982).

The board cannot create the power

to charge fees in the University by its rules. See Utah Mfrs.
Assfn v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 215, 23 P.2d 229, 236 (1933)
(fees must be expressly provided by statute).
The word "may11 is mandatory if it is the only reasonable
interpretation of the statute. Harding v. Alpine City, 656
P.2d 985 (Utah 1982).

"May11 is also mandatory if third parties

-10-
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are prejudiced by administrative inaction. Board of Educ. v.
Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033-35 (Utah 1983).

It is

unlikely that the legislature intended to allow the Board to
undo the Higher Education Act by redelegating back all of the
powers the legislature took away.
An agency may not completely delegate decisionmaking
authority that requires the exercise of discretion and informed
judgment. State Tax Comm'n v. Katsis, 90 Utah 406, 62 P.2d
120, 122-23 (1936).

It may only delegate ministerial duties,

such as factfinding duties, and other nondiscretionary
functions.

Id.; Anderson v. Grand River Dam Auth., 446 P.2d

814, 818 (Okla. 1968).
The interpretation and application of lease provisions to
determine whether the conditions precedent to a rent increase
have been satisfied, and what the new rent should be, are
judicial functions requiring the exercise of discretion.
Anderson v. Section 11, Inc., 626 P.2d 1027, 1028 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1981); Estwin Corp. v. Prescription Ctr. Pharmacy, Inc.,
563 P.2d 78 (Nev. 1977).

See Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 986 (1978)

(judicial interpretations of rent escalator clauses). It
should not be a legislative act, as is utility ratemaking,
because the contract clause in the constitution forbids a state
from legislatively altering its own obligations under a
contract.

United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1

(1977).
If this attempted abdication of responsibility is legal,
then what would stop the Public Service Commission from
-11-
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delegating all of its utility ratemaking duties to its staff?
These agencies must respect the checks and balances established
by statute. That the Board merely wanted to divest itself of
statutory duties is shown by the absence of any oversight of
the Village (R•360-61).

For these reasons, the rent increases

are void because they were not approved by the Board of Regents.
POINT III
THE PROCEDURES USED BY THE UNIVERSITY TO INCREASE
RENT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.
The University violated due process

by giving inadequate

notice and hearing opportunities to Craig before it increased
rent.

n

The government as landlord is still the government. It

must not act arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is
subject to the requirements of due process of law.11
United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
analysis requires a two-step inquiry.

Rudder v.

A due process

First, a property

interest must exist, then inquiry is made into what procedures
are required to protect that interest.

State ex rel. Summers

v. Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1980).
A*

Craig has a property interest in the amount of rent charged

by the University.

The lease sets rent at $244.00 per month,

with provision for increases if certain conditions are
satisfied (R.273).

Due process protects against erroneous rent

increases that exceed the restraints in the lease. Aguiar v*
Hawaii Hous. Auth., 522 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Hawaii 1974); Riger v.

5u.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art I, § 7.
-12-
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L 8c B Ltd. Partnership, 363 A.2d 481, 487 (Md. 1976).

The

terms of the lease create the expectation that rent will be
increased only if certain costs increase.

Expectations created

by express or implied contract that fix the duties of the
respective parties are property interests protected by due
process.

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).

See

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 647 P.2d
1293, 1297-98 (Utah 1982) (protecting legitimate expectations
not based on express contract).
The existence of a utility cost increase is one condition
precedent to a rent increase.

"The utility portion of

rent . . . may be increased from time to time due to increased
consumption or higher utility rates charged by
suppliers. . . • "

(R.273).

The other condition precedent is

an increase in debt service, maintenance or operating costs.
This condition is from the implied incorporation

of

§ 53-38-6 into the lease:
[A]11 income and revenues derived from the
operation of the building shall . . . be applied
solely to the payment of principal and interest
on the bonds, and . . . to the payment of the
cost of maintaining and operating the
building. . . .
The determination whether these costs have increased, and
by how much, is the kind of factual decision requiring a due
process hearing before a rent increase.

Thompson v.

^Controlling statutes are impliedly incorporated into
leases. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981). Section
53-38-6 is reprinted infra, at app. A-2.
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Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 638 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Langevin
v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 300 (2nd Cir. 1971).7
"Notice and hearing to individuals are fundamental rights when
government makes factual individual determinations which may
affect a person's fundamental interests.11
Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1982).

Concerned Parents v.
Rent increases for

existing leases is an adjustment of contract rights that is
traditionally adjudicated by courts. E.g., Anderson v. Section
11, Inc., 626 P.2d 1027 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981); Estwin Corp. v.
Prescription Ctr. Pharmacy, Inc., 563 P.2d 78 (Nev. 1977).
A rent escalation clause that contains no provision with
which to calculate the new rent with definiteness is
unenforceable for being too vague. Pingree v. Continental
Group, 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976).

The respondents must

therefore concede that there is a formula for fixing the new
rent, thus conceding a protectable property interest; or they
must claim there are no guidelines, which will void the rent
increases for indefiniteness. Id.
A separate but complimentary property interest is the
benefit of living in low cost housing. When the government
owns and operates a housing project for the purpose of
providing low cost housing, the tenants have a property
interest in keeping the rent low.

Thompson v. Washington, 497

7 The Langevin court found no due process right because there
was insufficient government involvement to invoke the
constitution. The same circuit later held that when the
housing is owned by government, notice and hearing are required
before rent increases. Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth.,
479 F.2d 1165 (2nd Cir. 1973).
-14-
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F.2d at 633, 638, 643; Aguiar v. Hawaii Bous. Auth., 522 P.2d
at 1267; Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d 1165
(2nd Cir. 1973).

The same is true for federally subsidized

housing, where the tenant is entitled to notice and an
opportunity to comment before federal authorities approve rent
increases.

Geneva Towers Tenants Org, v. Federated Mortgage

Inv., 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Note, "Procedural Due
Process in Government-Subsidized Housing,11 86 Harv. L. Rev. 880
(1973).

Contra:

Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir.

1970) (no property interest because federal housing law was
intended to induce private investment in housing).

Federeal

regulations now require notice and comment opportunities to
tenants in subsidized housing.

24 C.F.R. Part 401 (1983).

The Village is intended to provide low cost housing as an
inducement to students to attend the University, and as an
adjunct to the state student financial aids program (R.297).
Craig relied on the expectation of low cost housing as a
substantial factor influencing his decision to attend the
University of Utah (R.317).

The operation of government

institutions so as to create bona fide expectations and
reliance creates a property interest protected by due process.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600-01 (1972).
Evidence abounds that the legislature expects the Village
to provide low cost housing.

f,

The very premise of the program

is that the rents will be substantially lower than those
obtainable in the private market; otherwise public housing
would not be necessary.n

Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d at
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633.

There are strict limits on the items rent can be spent

on.

Utah Code Ann. § 53-38-6. The Village is not to operate

for profit (R.356, 361).

The property and operations of the

Village are exempt from taxation. Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-18.
The Village was constructed with low interest government bonds,
a substantial cost savings. These

,f

mortgageM payments are

further reduced by receipt of $473,239 in state land grant
interest in 1982 alone (R.259); and an annual federal bond
interest subsidy of $258,952 (R.253).
Basic maintenance and operating costs per unit should
theoretically be about the same for similar government and
private apartments. Thus, the only time rent for government
housing should even be close to private housing is when the
economic benefits of government ownership have been squandered
through profligacy.

For example, it is inconceivable that a

private landlord could make a profit with an $800,000 annual
payroll (R.253). The legislature did not provide a student
loan program9 to finance government waste through private
debt (R.14-15).

The lack of oversight by the Board of Regents

protects and allows uncontrolled administrative expenditures
(R.360-61, 357-59).

Craig has a property interest in rent to

prevent this kind of abuse of his legitimate expectations of

^Public housing owned by cities and counties also may not be
operated for profit or revenue; and rent may be no higher than
necessary to meet specified expenses. Utah Code Ann.
§ 55-18-10 (Supp. 1983).
9utah Code Ann. §§ 53-47-1 and -2; 53-47a-l to -8; 53-47b-l
to -14 (1953 as amended).
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low cost housing and prevent the unilateral alteration of his
lease.
B.

The procedures used to increase rent do not afford due

process.

The procedures required by due process are a matter

of federal constitutional law, otherwise the state could use
procedural limitations to virtually destroy state-created
rights.

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432

(1982).

See Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control

Common, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982) (applying this principle to
liquor license revocations).

The rent increase notification

procedures in the lease (R.273) are not controlling, nor are
they substitutes for due process.

Aguiar v. Hawaii Hous.

Auth., 522 P.2d at 1268; Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
425 F.2d 853, 864 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
The first prerequisite of due process is the availability
of a hearing before a citizens1 property rights are affected.
Notice serves no purpose if there is no provision for hearing
and evaluating comments.
hearing.

"There must be a full and public

There must be evidence sufficient to support the

necessary findings of fact.11

McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 96

Utah 203, 223, 85 P.2d 608, 617 (1938); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302-04 (1937).

Greater

formality and procedural regularity are required when a
university makes determinations of a student's nonacademic
rights.

Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89 (1978).

The rent approval proceedings before the Institutional
Council is not a hearing.

There is no presentation or
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evaluation of evidence, not even from the University.

The

reasonableness of the existing rent and the necessity of an
increase

are neither determined nor discussed (R.358). A

list of rental charges prepared by unknown university employees
is perfunctorily rubber-stamped without public discussion
(R.266-67). A public meeting whe.re no evidence is taken and
the administrative body merely accedes to the decision of its
staff is not the hearing required by due process. McGrew v*
Industrial Comm'n, 96 Utah at 224-25, 85 P.2d at 616-18.
For these agencies, which necessarily multiply in
our complex society, to serve the purposes for
which they are created and endowed with such vast
power, they must accredit themselves by acting in
harmony with the inbred concepts of fair play and
the cherished traditions of a cautious,
deliberate and judicious determination of the
questions affecting peoplefs rights or liberties.
Id., 96 Utah at 225, 85 P.2d at 618.
Due process also requires the allowance of adequate time to
prepare to meet the claims of the University.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1214 (Utah 1983).

Nelson v.

The University did

not produce the requested copies of three of the notices for
the challenged rent increases (R.302).

The fourth notice was

given on April 29, 1983 (R.269), a mere ten days before the May
9 meeting where rent was increased (R.266). No amount of time
is enough when the University has a policy of refusing to

10m nonconstitutional utility rate increase hearings, an
increase cannot be granted without evidence. Utah Dept. of
Bus. Reg, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980). A
rate increase cannot be based on old data to support the
existing rate. Utah State Bd. of Regents v. Utah Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 583 P.2d 609, 611 (Utah 1978jT
— ~ ~
~~~~...'.•.:
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release the financial records on which the increase is based
(R.354). 11

Of course, the notice and hearing must precede

the rent increase*
1267.

Aguiar v. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 522 P.2d at

See, Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982 (2nd

Cir. 1983) (predeprivation hearing required when deprivation is
pursuant to state policy).
The notice given must inform the student that he faces a
final deprivation of property as a result of the hearing
described in the notice.
1213.

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d at

Craig had no reason to believe the action of the

Institutional Council was final, assuming he knew about it,
because the former director of Student Family Housing had told
him the Board of Regents must approve rent increases before
they take effect (R.316).

An article to the same effect was

published in the student newspaper; The Daily Utah Chronicle,
May 11, 1983, at 1, 3.

The extent of Craig's confusion was

shown by the allegations of the Complaint that the board must
approve rent increases (R.9).

The lack of notice that the

University's action was final violates due process.
The notices were also fatally defective because they did
not inform Craig of any alleged opportunity to comment on rent
increases to any person or in any forum (R.317, 354-55).

By

all appearances and terminology, the notices were final and
there was no information about a chance to comment (R.269,
316-17, 356). This does not satisfy due process, even if other
unsel for respondents correctly noted that these
documents are public records that must be made available for
copying (R.332).
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persons knew of the alleged opportunity to comment. Worrall v.
Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980); Memphis Light,
Gas Se Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1978).
Craig's interest in proper procedures is substantial.
Skyrocketing rent threatens his financial ability to remain in
school and increases his student loan debt (R.14-15).

If he

challenges a rent increase without paying, he not only faces
eviction, but the University will hold his registration and
academic transcript (R.273).
be expelled.

There is no choice but to pay or

The transcript hold prevents transfer to another

university, graduation, and entry into his chosen profession.
Strict compliance with due process is required when property
interests are affected that threaten the student's financial
ability to continue in college. Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d
1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1980).
The additional cost to the respondents to provide more
procedure would not be great. The University should already be
compiling cost analyses and making a presentation to justify
rent increases, although it is not presently doing this.

Thus,

the University will not have to do much more than is already
expected for normal administrative decisionmaking.

The

difference will be that the Board of Regents will now have to
look at both sides instead of none. But the board's staff can
be used to reduce this load by initially analyzing the comments
and data.

Every agency, city, and county in the state must

provide public hearings, so the respondents should not seek
special treatment. Administrative inconvenience is no excuse
-20-
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for ignoring the fundamental right to due process*

Ohio Bell

Telephone Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. at 304-05.
Due process is a flexible concept.

It does not require

separate oral hearings for each affected student.

The exact

format of the hearing process may need to be developed over
time.

The constitutional minimum was expressed in Burr v. New

Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d at 1170:
Notice of a proposed increase in rent shall be
served well in advance of the date for the
increase. Opportunity for filing written
objections shall be given. There need be no
opportunity for oral presentation. The tenants
or their representatives shall have the right to
submit any material they consider relevant to
disprove the need for the rent increase.
Finally, the Review Board upon reaching a
decision shall issue a statement outlining the
reasons for either approving [,modifying,] or
rejecting the requested rent increase. The
tenants may of course be represented by counsel.
The due process clause and the contract clause in the
constitution require that a state act only out of necessity and
with utmost fairness when changing material terms in a
contract.

Procedural regularity is indispensable to safeguard

the citizen and the sanctity of contract.

M

It is procedure

that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule
by whim or caprice.n

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.

McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring).
POINT IV
THE USE OF RENT TO SUPPORT THE UNIVERSITY AND
MAKE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION.
The taking of private property for public use without just
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compensation

and the levy of illegal and discriminatory

taxes on students are prohibited regardless of the procedures
used.

The respondents have built certain charges into the rent

that are not to cover unique expenses of the Village, but are
designed to provide revenue for the University.

n

[A]

reasonable charge for a specific service is permissible,
whereas a general fee that amounts to a revenue measure is
not.11

Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1982).

Reasonableness is not ordinarily determined by summary
judgment.

Id.

However, the charges at issue here are so

inherently inequitable that they are unreasonable per se. Id.
In addition, the charges are not for specific services but for
general governmental duties.
Although Craig was not allowed any discovery, he was able
to identify the following payments:

(1) using rent to

subsidize other facilities in the Student Housing Bond System
(R.12, HIT 37, 38); (2) using rent to finance a second
maintenance facility at the Village (R.359); (3) surplus
utilities charges are given to the University (R.358);
(4) interest earned from rent deposited in the bank is taken by
the University (R.351); (5) direct charges for University
administrative expenses (B..8, 11-12, 22); (6) surplus rent not
spent on capital improvements is given to the University
(R-354).

12|fprivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.11 Utah Const, art. I, § 22.

-22-
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A.

These forfeitures and fees are unconstsitutional takings

for general government revenues.

The University's powers to

use funds in its care are strictly limited by statute.

First

Equity Corp. v. Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975);
University of Utah v. Bd. of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 439-40,
295 P.2d 348, 369-70 (1956).

As state agencies, the

respondents have no power to tax anybody to raise revenue.
Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 227,
231-32, 48 P.2d 526, 528 (1935).

Accordingly, the Village is

not to be operated for profit or as a revenue source (R.356,
361).
The power to charge rent must be narrowly construed to
extend only to payment for the cost of benefits not shared by
other members of society.

National Cable Tel. Ass'n v. United

States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974).

Abroad interpretation

creates constitutional problems as a delegation of taxing
power.

Id. at 342-43.

Without legal limits--imposed by

statute or constitution--rent could be used to evade budgetary
restrictions and accountability for expenditures.

A strict

construction of the rent power is compelled by § 53-38-6, which
requires rent to be "applied solely to the payment of principal
and of interest on the bonds, and . . . to the payment of the
cost of maintaining and operating the building.11
added.)

(Emphasis

An agency cannot use its rules to create fees that are

13 A s to the complete lack of accountability under the present
system, see R.357, 11 13; 358-61.
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not established by statute.

Utah Mfrs. Ass'n v. Stewart, 82

Utah 198, 215, 23 P.2d 229, 236 (1933).
Certain factors for a void fee may be gleaned from the
cases.

The fee must have some relationship to the need for

services created by the activities of the payor.
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979).

Call v. City

It must pay for

a specific benefit provided to the payor that is "not shared by
other members of society.,f

National Cable Television Ass'n,

415 U.S. at 341; Cache County v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 227, 61
P. 303, 308 (1900).

The recipient of a unit of service must be

identifiable apart from the general public.

FPC v. New England

Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974). All citizens who share
in the benfit of the service must pay their fair share of the
cost. Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1982).
If these factors are minimal or merely incidental, and the
money is used primarily as revenue for general university
purposes, it is a "tax" regardless of the actual label used to
describe it. Weber Basin Home Builders Assfn v. Roy City, 26
Utah 2d 215, 217, 487 P.2d 866, 867 (1971).
The automatic forfeiture of unspent rent and utilities
payments to the University at the end of each fiscal year is
obviously not a charge for a service. This windfall to the
University is prohibited because the Village cannot be a
revenue source. This policy is the motivation for many
unnecessary expenditures by the Village (R.354, 1T 6), which
must be stopped if the Village is ever going to be run in an
economical manner to provide low cost housing.
-24-
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reasons, there is no legal justification for the Village to
subsidize revenue shortfalls for other campus enterprises.
The University also makes a direct charge for police, fire,
public relations, personnel services and other administrative
activities of the University (R.8, 11-12 (allegations admitted
in Answer, 22)). This charge is in addition to the
administrative costs of the Village, which are a part of the
Village operating budget (R.253).

These University-wide

services are already paid for from taxes and general student
fees other than rent {R.8, 12 IT 35, 22).
Salt Lake City is already obligated to provide police and
fire protection to all residents of the city, so the Village is
not receiving a special benefit that is otherwise unavailable
to the public.
amended).

Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-7-1; 10-6-61 (1953 as

These services are the inherent sovereign duties of

government, not a special service uniquely required by the
Village.

Salt Lake City v. International Assfn of

Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 789 (Utah 1977).

The legislature

has not authorized the imposition of fees on students to pay
for essential governmental services already paid for from other
sources, so these fees are void.
Rent is collected to pay bond debt, utility, maintenance,
and operating costs of the Village.

"If money is collected

from the public for a specified purpose, it becomes a trust
fund committed to the carrying out of that purpose.11
City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d at 200.

Call v«

Once the trust purpose

is fulfilled for each fiscal year, the surplus should be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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refunded under the principles of constructive trust.
be used as general revenue.

Id.

It cannot

In Bishop v. J.E. Crofts 8c

Sons., 545 P.2d 520 (Utah 1976), surplus insurance premiums and
dividends earned by a nonprofit corporation that purchased
insurance for its members was refunded under constructive
trust.

In Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976), rents

and profits earned by a real estate agent before the sale of
property were held in constructive trust for the seller.
A constructive trust is imposed on money paid to another
for a specified purpose in order to prevent fraud and unjust
enrichment.
(1949).

Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229

It is unjust enrichment for the University to keep the

surplus because the Village is not supposed to be a revenue
source.

Cf* Bishop v. J.E. Crofts 8c Sons, where a nonprofit

corporation was a constructive trustee.

In Texas Eastern

Transfn Corp. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970), a gas company was required to
refund excess revenue to consumers because utilities regulation
was intended to provide low cost gas, and a refund would
further that purpose.

It is also fraudulent for the University

to use coercive state power--the threat of expulsion from
college and eviction--to collect excessive rent for phantom
expenses when it intends to keep the economic benefit of the
surplus.
Because rent is a trust fund, so is the interest earned on
rent deposited in the bank.

Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake

County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Utah 1983) (interest on taxes
-26-
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collected for school districts).

All of the profit a trustee

earns on the trust funds must be paid over with the refund, or
at least used for trust purposes.

Bishop v. J.E. Crofts &

Sons, 545 P.2d at 524.
?•

The use of rent for capital improvements and new

construction is an illegal tax.

Craig is not obligated under

the lease to pay for capital improvements to University
property.

In 1982, the Village spent at least $550,070 for

such capital improvements as new asphalt and concrete, roof
replacements, peripheral lighting, and secondary electrical
upgrade (R.260).

It also spent $366,000 for construction

of a new maintenance building.

These expenses were paid from

rent.
The term "maintenance11 in § 53-38-6, as incorporated into
the lease, has a definite meaning in landlord tenant law.

It

means "to keep in a particular state or condition, especially
with reference to efficiency; to support, to sustain, to keep
up; not to suffer to fail or decline.11

Mid-Continent Life Ins.

Co. v. Henry's, Inc., 520 P.2d 1319, 1324-25 (Kan. 1974).

This

definition excludes major structural repairs that survive the
term of the lease and are not necessary because of a special
use of the premises by the tenant.

Id.

When structural

repairs are necessary to comply with building codes, the
landlord, not the tenant, must pay for the repair.

Wolfe v.

l^The University owns the exterior electrical distribution
system in the Village. In buying electricity from Utah Power Sc
Light Co. for resale at the Village, it is operating as an
unregulated electric utility (R.357).
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White, 114 Utah 39, 197 P.2d 125 (1948) (roof replacement);
Pingree v. Continental Group, 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976) (fire
escape)•
If the landlord voluntarily undertakes improvements not
required by law, he must still pay for them.

Glenn R. Sewell

Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde, 451 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1969).

It is

unjust enrichment to require tenants who happen to live in the
Village in a given year to pay for capital improvements that
primarily benefit the state's reversionary interest. See
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 521, 543-48 (1968) (primary benefit to the
landlord's reversionary interest is a major factor in deciding
who pays for major repairs).

In the lease at issue here, the

University unambiguously assumed financial responsibility for
all repairs and renovations (R.274).

It is a breach of the

lease to try to shift these costs to Craig.
Unlike cases involving sewer connection fees and similar
fees for municipal improvements, the person who pays, the
tenant, receives no benefits to his real property.

So long as

the University continues to make massive cash investments in
capital improvements, there is no way to equitably spread the
cost among present and future beneficiaries, as required by the
lease and the constitution. Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d
376, 379 (Utah 1982); Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City,
631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
The legislature has provided a way to equitably finance new
construction and capital improvements. These methods are
appropriations, revenue bonds, contracts with the United
-28-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

States, long term contracts and loans*
§§ 53-38-2 to -16 (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann.

All of these methods

spread the cost over the entire group of tenants who will
supposedly benefit.

Rather than use these methods, the

University uses rent directly for cash payments, or it uses
surplus cash in the bond account, as it did with the second
maintenance building (R.220).

Either way, the money comes from

rent (R.359, 183-90).
The respondents do not have the power to use their rules to
create new ways to finance capital improvements.

The

legislative listing of approved methods impliedly excludes the
use of unlisted methods; just as the listing of authorized
investments impliedly excluded unlisted investments in First
Equity Corp. v. Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d at 892.

General

sections of the statutes are construed no more broadly than
provisions that specifically treat the same subject.

In re

Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 547-48 (Utah
1983).

Thus, wherever the respondent's claim to derive

authority to avoid statutory limitations on financing, it
cannot be construed to extend to a subject already specifically
covered.
C.

The present procedures for approving capital improvements

are unlawful.

The Board of Regents is required to "approve or

disapprove all new construction, repair, rehabilitation, or
purchase of educational and general buildings and facilities
financed from any source at all institutions subject to the
jurisdiction of the board. . . . n

Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-17
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(1953 as amended) (reprinted in Appendix).

The board did not

approve the construction of the maintenance building, nor has
it authorized any of the other capital improvements at the
Village since it abdicated its duties in 1980 (R.361). These
expenditures are void because the board is the only authority
having power to construct or remodel buildings on behalf of the
University.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 53-38-1(1), 53-48-16 (1953 as

amended) (reprinted in the Appendix).
The respondents claim that their rules allow rent to be
used to finance new construction without prior approval by the
Board of Regents (R.117-19).

Contrary to the Board's rule, the

law says that approval must be given regardless of the source
of financing.

!,

The rules adopted by an administrative agency

are not binding on the courts and an 'administrative
interpretation out of harmony and contrary to the express
provisions of a statute cannot be given weight.1" West Jordan
v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah 1982) (quoting Utah Hotel
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 Utah 24, 32, 151 P.2d 467, 471
(1944)).

A clear and unambiguous statute is enforced as

written.
With the maintenance building, the University also evaded
restrictions on accepting bids exceeding the estimated cost of
the project. Bids cannot be accepted if the lowest bid exceeds
the cost estimate by more than 5%.
§ 63-56-21(7) (Supp. 1983).

Utah Code Ann.

"Competitive sealed bidding is

unsuccessful when all bids . . . are unreasonable,
noncompetitive, or the low bid exceeds available funds as
-30-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

certified by the appropriate fiscal officer.11

Utah State Bldg.

Bd. Regs, for the Procurement of Constr. and Prof. Serv.,
§ VE(2) (1980).

The lowest bid exceeded the estimated cost by

$35,700, or 12.3% (R.93).

This high bid was not approved by

the Institutional Council until June 13, 1983 (R.244 (the date
is in the far upper right-hand corner)); nearly one month after
the contract was signed (R.86).

The last rent increase was

decided on the same day the University accepted the
budget-busting bid (R.92, 269).
In summary, the University has been acting without
restraint or authority in purchasing capital improvements and
new construction with rent.

These are not legitimate

maintenance costs and are contrary to the lease.

The state's

reversionary interest benefits much more than a tenant's
leasehold.

The respondents must use approved financing methods

to spread the cost equitably.

Furthermore, the Village is

being operated contrary to the respondents' own rules as a
source of revenue for general University administrative
expenses.

These actions violate substantive due process and

the rational basis level of equal protection analysis.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING CRAIG'S SECOND
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The trial court refused to hear argument on Craig's second
motion for partial summary judgment because he felt that the
earlier ruling had disposed of the case (R.384-89)•
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Instead,

he sua sponte struck the motion (R.365).

The case was

still pending because the prior minute entry had not been
reduced to judgment. New evidence in the form of admissions
and affidavits was submitted. A motion for summary judgment is
nearly always relevant, so it should have been granted or
denied, not stricken.

If a motion for summary judgment

presents the case in a different light because of new evidence
or the like, a prior ruling may be reexamined if the case is
still pending.

Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at

1033.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING CRAIG AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCOVERY.
Craig filed an affidavit and motion for a continuance of
the respondents1 motions for summary judgment because they had
not responded to his discovery requests and he had no evidence
to challenge the supporting affidavits (R.317, 314, 325). The
requests for admission and requests for the production of
documents are specific and detailed in listing the needed
evidence, which was in sole possession of the respondents.
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse

l^The respondents filed a motion to strike this motion on the
day of the hearing (R.366). This motion could not have been
granted, even if the judge knew about it, without at least five
days notice. Utah R. Civ. P. 6(d).

-32-
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the application for judgment. . . ."

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f).

The discovery requests were filed only ten days after Craig
received the respondents' motions wherein, for the first time,
he learned which points the respondents would contest.

This,

too, after the respondents had twice delayed a hearing on
Craig's motion for two months just so they could file their
motions for summary judgment.

Where the party opposing a

motion for summary judgment had no prior knowledge of facts
presented by affidavit in support of the motion, and the movant
has exclusive possession of necessary evidence, it is an abuse
of discretion to refuse a continuance.

Auerbach's v. Kimball,

572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977); Strand v. Associated Students of
the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977).
Summary judgment is not a penalty for not conducting
discovery on the timetable set by the opposing party.

It is

improper to consider the materials submitted in support of a
motion for summary judgment when the opposing party has not had
discovery to permit impeachment of the supporting affidavits.
Miller v. Alexander, 25 Fed. R. Serv.2d 1040 (D.D.C. 1975).
Every inference that would indicate the existence of a
material issue of fact should be given to the party opposing a
motion for summary judgment.
434 (Utah 1982).

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d

It is impossible for the judge to have known

the factual basis for Craig's claim and what the challenged
policies, practices, and procedures are without discovery.

The

refusal to allow discovery until after a motion to dismiss is
heard may cause unfair prejudice to the non-moving party.
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Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1979)-

It was

therefore reversible error to grant summary judgment against
Craig without an opportunity for discovery.

In addition, the

materials presented in support of the motion ignored argument
on the constitutional issues (R.321, 312-14), and were
inadequate to show that the respondents were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Rather than being ruled by law, the Village is ruled by
fiat.

Like the feudal lords of old, the rulers of the Village

operate free of restraint or oversight. They do not feel
constrained to follow the most direct commands of the
legislature. They are more likely to change their contract
than honor it (R.276 §§ 12(a), 15; 337-38).

Such is the result

when the lead agency abdicates all responsibility and
frustrates a carefully designed system of checks and balances.
This would always be the case were it not for the state and
federal constitutions, wherein procedure is the protector of
the disadvantaged.
Craig is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
respondents1 policies and procedures in setting and spending
rent deny procedural and substantive due process. Craig is
entitled to restitution of all rent that was unlawfully taken
and spent. He is also entitled to the costs of this appeal and
the cost of printing the brief. Utah R. Civ. P. 75(p)(5). As
an action jointly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and the

-34-
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state declaratory judgment statute, costs are awardable to the
prevailing party.

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V. 1981); Utah Code

Ann. § 78-33-10 (1953 as amended). A remand is necessary to
calculate the amount of restitution to be paid.
Respectfully submitted this

M

day of January, 1984.

M
Craig J. Reece^
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on January

/ / , 1984, I hand-delivered

four copies of this brief to Douglas C. Richards and Bill L.
Walker, Assistant Attorneys General, 236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah.
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APPENDIX

All references to Utah Code Ann. (1981).
53-38-1. Powers of state board--Projects
and buildings. The state board of higher
education on behalf of the University of Utah,
the College of Eastern Utah, Utah State
University of Agriculture and Applied Science,
Snow College, Weber State College, Southern Utah
State College, Dixie College, and the Utah
Technical Colleges at Salt Lake and Provo (all
being state institutions of higher learning) is
authorized and empowered on behalf of such
institutions:
(1) To acquire, purchase, construct,
improve, remodel, add to, and extend
self-liquidating projects, revenue-producing
buildings, and all other projects and facilities
including, but not limited to: classrooms and
other instructional facilities; laboratory
facilities and buildings for the conduct of
research and development; libraries and study
facilities; continuing education conference
centers; administrative and office facilities,
including computers and data processing
equipment; museums; necessary and related
utilities; dormitories and other suitable living
quarters or accommodations; dining halls,
kitchens, and other food service and preparation
facilities; student union buildings for student
services and activity facilities and bookstores;
physical education, athletic facilities,
fieldhouses, stadiums, and gymnasiums; theaters,
auditoriums, parking lots, and parking
structures; storage and maintenance facilities;
and infirmaries, hospitals, and medical and
health facilities. . . .
(4) To equip, furnish, maintain and operate
such projects and buildings. For the use and
availability of the foregoing, the board may
impose and collect rents, fees, and charges from
students, faculty members, and other persons,
firms, and corporations, both public and
private. As used in this chapter, "projects11 and
"buildings11 include any one or more of such
facilities.
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53-38-6. Disposition and use of income
derived from operation of buildings--Payment of
principal and interest of bonds* That except as
to revenues paid directly to a trustee under the
provisions of subsection (6) of section 53-38-3
hereof, all income and revenues derived from the
operation of the building shall be deposited as
collected in a fund in a bank or trust company
approved as a regular depository by the state
depository board, to be applied solely to the
payment of the principal of and interest on the
bonds, and, to the extent so provided in the
resolution authorizing the bonds, to the payment
of the cost of maintaining and operating the
building and the establishment of reserves for
such purposes. As principal and interest become
due from time to time, the treasurer of the
board, or such other fiscal officer of the
institution as may be designated by resolution of
the board, shall, not less than fifteen days
prior to the payment date, transmit to the paying
agent for the bonds, money from said fund in an
amount sufficient to pay the principal or
interest so falling due. Said funds and the
money therein is irrevocably pledged to such
purposes.
53-48-16. Property of institutions to vest
in board. The board shall succeed to and be
vested with all the powers and authority relating
to all properties, real and personal, tangible
and intangible and to the control and management
thereof which was held by the governing board of
each institution prior to the effective date of
this act.
53-48-17. Buildings and facilities—Board
to approve all construction and purchases. TEe
board shall approve or disapprove all new
constsruction, repair and rehabilitation or
purchase of educational and general buildings and
facilities financed from any source at all
institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the
board. No institution shall submit plans or
specifications to the state building board for
the construction or alteration of buildings,
structures or racilities or for the purchases of
equipment of fixtures therefor without the
authorization and approval of the board.

A-2
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R. Prac. Dist. 8c Cir. Courts
Rule 2.9 Written Orders, Judgments, and Decrees
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for
the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall
within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter time
as the court may direct, file with the court a
proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity
with the rulings

*

(b) Copies of the proposed Findings,
Judgments, and/or Orders shall be served on
opposing counsel before being presented to the
court for signature unless the court otherwise
orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five
(5) days after service.
State Court Jurisdiction Over a Federal Civil Rights Claim
This action was filed jointly under the state declaratory
judgment statute and the federal civil rights statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp, V 1981).

Neither the respondents nor the

trial court challenged jurisdiction.

State courts may accept

jurisdiction of a claim under § 1983, but the United States
Supreme Court has reserved the question whether states are
obligated to do so.

Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.l

(1980).
Section 1983 provides:
§ 1983.

Civil action for deprivation of rights.

Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
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section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
Several states have accepted jurisdiction of suits under
this section*

The propriety of their doing so was noted in

Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980):
We note that the California courts accepted
jurisdiction of this federal claim. That
exercise of jurisdiction appears to be consistent
with the general rule that where
,!f
an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party
aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its
enforcement, there is no reason why it should not
be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some
act of Congress, by a proper action in a State
court.111 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391,
quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137.
See also Aldinger v. HowafoT, 427 U.S. 1, 36, n.17
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Grubb v. Public
Utilities Commfn, 281 U.S. 470, 476. WeHETave
never considered, however, the question whether a
State must entertain a claim under § 1983. We
note that where the same type of claim, if
arising under state law, would be enforced in the
state courts, the state courts are generally not
free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim.
Testa v. Katt, supra, at 394. But see
Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 442 S.W.2d

248 (1%9).
As this citation makes clear, state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the federal and respective
state constitutions.

See Young v. Board of Educ, 416 F. Supp.

1139 (D. Colo. 1976), and Brown v. Pitchess, 531 P.2d 772 (Cal.
1975) , for ample citations and reasoning for allowing § 1983
actions in state courts.
State district courts have jurisdiction over all civil
matters unless specifically excepted by statute. Utah Const.
art. VIII, § 7; Ford Canal Co. v. Cox, 92 Utah 148, 59 P.2d 935
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(1936).

This would logically include federal causes of

action.

Section 1983 does not create new rights, it is a

procedural mechanism for protecting existing rights. Chapman
v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979).
State law provides the rule of decision in § 1983 cases unless
it is inconsistent with the federal constitution.

Board of

Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); Espinoza v. O'Dell,
633 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981).

It would seem logical and more

efficient for a state court to resolve important questions of
state law, such as are presented in this case, instead of
forcing a plaintiff into federal court.
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